

## Friday evening, 8 September 2006

Generate a good motivation wishing to attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings and for this purpose or aim generate love, compassion, and bodhichitta or the mind of enlightenment.

Ishvara is not space because it is without movement.  
He is not the self because that has already been refuted before.  
He is also a creator who is unthinkable;  
What is the point in talking about the unthinkable? (120)

There is a school that says that Ishvara is the creator of everything. Space is not Ishvara. Ishvara does not move whereas to bring a result something must move. A permanent self is not Ishvara because it is not a material thing and not a knower, this was already refuted before. The self is permanent according to the non-Buddhist schools, so is the being. This permanent self is not Ishvara because it is not material and it is not a knower, that the self is Ishvara has already been refuted. Ishvara is unthinkable so he is not a creator. Ishvara is not creator, therefore you Vaisheshikas or followers of Ishvara who is Ishvara? Since he is unthinkable how can you think about him? This school says that all things are created by Ishvara, whatever he thinks of comes into existence. For example, if he thinks that it would be nice for a pizza to arrive on the table, then it arrives. Therefore, according to them everything is created by Ishvara's thoughts. This is refuted by Dharmakirti in his *Pramanavartika*.

Also what is he asserted to produce?  
Are not the entity of the self,  
Earth and so forth, and Ishvara permanent?  
Consciousness is produced from an object to be known and (121)

Beginningless happiness and suffering come from karma,  
Therefore, what do you claim is produced by him?  
If the cause does not have a beginning,  
How could there be a beginning of results? (122)

If something is permanent then conditions cannot serve as its cause. That which is permanent, Ishvara, cannot create any result.

All feelings, happiness feeling, suffering, feeling, unhappiness feelings, and mental happiness feeling, all come from actions or karma created in the past. Therefore, how can you say that Ishvara produces results? Ishvara is permanent, therefore how can you say that his desires create a result? They respond that results are created by the cause that is the self. However, this is also not right because the self and also the earth and so forth maybe they can give rise to a similar type after themselves but they are not created by Ishvara. Ishvara cannot create anything. The self and the four elements and atoms and Ishvara and so forth are not impermanent because you accept that they are permanent. Therefore, such things cannot produce a result, that is, are not suitable to produce a result. That which is permanent cannot be produce things that are permanent. For example, the eye consciousness to which blue appears is produced in dependence on the object, blue, in our system. If I see blue, the consciousness to which blue appears arises in dependence on the condition that is the object, blue. The same is true of an eye consciousness see red, yellow, and any other color, as

well as one that sees long, short, and so forth. For something to appear to a consciousness an observed object condition is necessary.

From beginningless time we have generated happiness and suffering feeling, this comes from a previous cause. From virtuous causes or actions happiness is produced and from non-virtuous causes or actions suffering is produced. So what kind of result does Ishvara produce? Tell me now! Since you are unable to reply Ishvara does not produce any result – he does not exist. If causes do not have a beginning, then how can results have a beginning?

Why would they not always function?  
If he does not depend on other and  
There does not exist other that is not created by him,  
Due to that, on what do they depend? (123)

If causes are beginningless, Ishvara is accepted to be a permanent thing, therefore he is beginningless. So also results have are beginningless? Results that have a beginning would not exist. If today we generate some kind of feeling, since the cause, Ishvara, is without beginning, so should the result, this feeling, be beginningless? If Ishvara at all times is the creator of results, then why are results not created at all times? He did not create them because results are produced in dependence on other conditions. If there are results that exist that are not created by Ishvara, therefore in order for Ishvara to produced results he needs to depend on other conditions. He himself would have to rely on other conditions. If it is like this, then Ishvara is not permanent because he relies on causes and conditions.

That very collection on which they depend  
Would be the cause, not Ishvara.  
When assembled, he would lack the power to not produce them, and  
When they are absent, he would lack the power to produce them. (124)

If Ishvara in order to produce results relies on some simultaneously existing conditions, then the collection of conditions would be their results. Ishvara would not have the power to produce results because results are produced in dependence on causes and conditions. Without that collection, Ishvara cannot produce any result by his own power.

If they are created without Ishvara desiring them,  
It would follow that they are under the control of other.  
Even if they are desired, if they are created  
In dependence on desire, what would become of Ishvara? (125)

If Ishvara does not desire something, but still results such as the suffering of the hell realm, animal realm, hungry ghost realm or the various sufferings of human beings are produced by actions, then since they are not created by the power of Ishvara they are produced by the power of other. Therefore, it is not right that Ishvara is the creator, your assertion that he is the creator is completely unfounded. Since he cannot produce anything by his own power, your assertion is lost. The Vaisheshika's assertions that Ishvara is the creator degenerates. If things are created by Ishvara's desire, they are not created by Ishvara but by the force of desire, a mind of desire. Since desire is impermanent, Ishvara is not the creator. Ishvara is not the creator, desire is the creator. However, desire is impermanent, sometimes we want to go inside and sometimes go outside, sometime put on clothes and sometimes take off clothes. These impermanent desires produce results.

Those propounding permanent subtle particles,  
They too were already turned away before. (126ab)

Among the Vaisheshikas there are different opinions, some of them think that subtle particles are permanent. They say that the various types of beings, those of the six realms (hell beings, hungry ghosts, animals, human beings, demi-gods, and gods), are created by permanent subtle particles. This has already been refuted, that is, the existence of partless particles was refuted previously.

The Samkyas assert a permanent Primal Substance  
Is the cause of migrating beings. (126cd)

The qualities of that called “lightness,  
Motility, and darkness” abiding in balance  
Are finely expressed to be that called “the Primal Substance.”  
The unbalanced are said to be going. (127)

The Samkyas assert a primordial nature produces the sixteen attributes that are results and not causes. The being is not the nature of cause and not the nature of result. They assert twenty-five objects of knowledge. The first one is the Primordial Principle, then there are seven, the four great elements and the three, lightness, motility, and darkness, then there are the sixteen results, and the being. The Primordial Principle is permanent and partless and has the five characteristics of not manifesting and so forth. It is the cause of all the different results. Happiness, suffering, and neutral feelings are called by the Samkyas lightness, motility, and darkness, [this being the Primordial Principle]. This is the assertion of the Samkyas but it is unacceptable to all the Buddhist schools. We do not accept a Primordial Principle that is a creator.

Saturday morning, 9 September 2006

Try to generate a good motivation wishing to benefit sentient beings and for this purpose develop the mind of enlightenment and its causes, the mind of love toward all sentient beings.

Since the three natures are not suitable  
In a unity, it does not exist.  
Likewise, the qualities do not exist  
Because they too are three individual aspects. (128)

This refutes that a partless Primordial Principle is the causes of the different qualities or results. The Primordial Principle is a unity. The three natures are happiness, suffering, and equanimity feelings forms and so forth; they are not suitable as a unity, that is, as a partless Primordial Principle, because they are different and abide as three individual aspects. Such truly existent qualities do not exist because each one of them abides separately or individually.

If the qualities do not exist, also the existence of  
Sound and so forth becomes extremely farfetched. (129ab)

If the qualities of the Primordial Principle do not exist, also the existence of forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects becomes extremely farfetched. The Samkyas accept five mere ones (de tsam nga) – mere forms, mere sounds, mere odors, mere tastes, and mere tangible objects, which are the results of a permanent, partless Primordial Principle. However, this is impossible.

That with respect to the mindless, cloth and so forth,  
Happiness and so forth exist is also not possible. (129)

That which is without mind – matter – such as clothing and so forth, cannot be the same substance as happiness and so forth. In other words, happiness and so forth are not one entity with matter and clothing is not one entity with happiness and so forth. Clothing is not the nature of happiness. For example, sometimes clothing causes us to experience suffering, such as that of heaviness or roughness. That there are truly existent things has already been refuted.

“Those things are the nature of causes.”  
Have things not already been thoroughly analyzed?  
For you also the causes are happiness and so forth,  
But woolen blankets and so forth do not arise from them. (130)

From woolen blankets there is happiness and so forth.  
Because they do not exist, happiness and so forth do not exist.  
Happiness and so forth have never  
Been observed to be permanent. (131)

The Samkyas assert that woolen cloth has as its cause the Primordial Principle which is a balance of happiness and so forth. However, woolen cloth cannot arise from a partless Primordial Principle because the Primordial Principle does not exist. From woolen cloth can arise happiness and so forth. When the woolen cloth finishes, the happiness and so forth, its results, which are the qualities of the Primordial Principle, also finish. In short, when the causes finish, the results also finish. The woolen cloth is the cause of happiness, therefore when it no longer exists also the result, happiness, ceases to exist. Therefore, a Primordial Principle that is happiness and so forth cannot exist. Therefore, the Samkyas assertion of a permanent Primordial Principle that is happiness, suffering, and equanimity is refuted.

If happiness and so forth visibly exist,  
Why is the experience not apprehended?  
You say “They become subtle,”  
But how are they coarse and also subtle? (132)

Happiness and so forth have the entity of being impermanent. The entity of happiness and so forth is not permanent because if they were permanent they would always exist but there are times that they do not exist. They are not always observed by a valid cognizer. If happiness were manifestly existent and a permanent thing, why when we experience suffering we cannot experience happiness? If happiness were permanent it would always exist even when we experience suffering, however this is not the case. The Samkyas say that when we experience suffering, the happiness becomes subtle. However, it is not right that a coarse feeling is abandoned and a subtle feeling comes into existence because you Samkyas accept that all feelings are permanent. That which is permanent cannot change. It cannot be that sometimes a subtle happiness is abandoned and a coarse happiness becomes manifest, and at other times a coarse happiness is abandoned and a subtle happiness becomes subtle. If it were like this it would mean that feelings are impermanent because they change, becoming subtle and manifest. Therefore, that feelings can change from subtle to coarse and vice versa indicates that they are impermanent.

Here in this commentary there is an extensive refutation of the different tenets. The Samkyas accept an ultimately existent, inherently existent, and truly existent permanent, partless Primordial Substance. The tenets of the Samkyas say that the self or being can achieve nirvana or liberation, but how does it do this? They say that the being examines who created all the different results, the different faculties and so forth, and finds that they were created by the partless Primordial Principle. When the Primordial Principle finds that it has been discovered, it is ashamed and withdraws all its

results and it itself disappears like a rainbow in the sky. At this time when causes and results no longer exists, the being has achieved liberation. This is the idea of the Samkyas in brief.

Since having given up being coarse, they become subtle,  
Those coarse and subtle ones are just impermanent.  
Likewise, why do you not assert  
All things to be impermanent? (133)

Having given up being coarse, it becomes subtle. Having given up being subtle, it becomes coarse. Therefore, the coarse and the subtle are impermanent. So why do you not assert that all functioning things are impermanent since they have the nature of changing into other?

If the coarse is nothing other than happiness,  
Happiness is clearly impermanent.

If coarse happiness is nothing other than happiness, that is, is not a different substance from happiness, then to say that coarse happiness is given up but happiness is still manifestly experienced is incorrect because coarse happiness has ceased. These two – coarse and subtle happiness – are one entity. Therefore, they must be impermanent because the coarse ceases and the subtle arises, and the subtle ceases and the coarse arises. Therefore, to say that the entity of happiness is permanent is impossible.

When asserting “That which does not exist whatsoever  
Is not produced because it does not exist,” (134)

It would be impossible for a previously non-existent result to be produced newly because everything is one entity with the permanent, partless Primordial Principle. This is what you Samkyas assert.

Although you do not assert that  
The visibly non-existent are produced, they abide.  
But if the result abides in the cause,  
To eat food would be to eat excrement. (135)

The Samkyas assert that at the time of the cause, the result already exists in an unmanifest way. If this were the case, at the time one eats food, excrement would already exist in an unmanifest way. Therefore, when you eat food, you eat excrement. This is because they are one entity with the nature of the permanent, partless Primordial Principle. According to the Buddhist schools the result does not abide in the cause, whereas the Samkyas assert this. For this reason Shantideva sets out this debate with them.

If one wants to make woolen clothing, first one needs to make the wool and then from this comes the cloth. However, this would not be necessary according to the Samkyas. According to them we would be able to wear woolen clothing without the need to make them because the wool and the woolen clothing are one nature with the Primordial Principle. Therefore, your assertions are harmed by many reasonings. This discussion is quite long here.

You should wear cotton seeds  
With the price of cotton.  
You say “Due to ignorance the worldly do not see,”  
But those who know reality posit it. (136)

The Samkyas say that due to ignorance the worldly do not see. Therefore, our position is right, it is just that it cannot be seen due to ignorance. There was a well-know Indian pandit Ashvagosha who originally was a non-Buddhist Samkya but after losing a debate with Aryadeva he became a Buddhist. Ashvagosha went to Nalanda Monastery with the wish to debate the monks. They made the agreement that if the monks lost they were to become his followers, whereas if he lost he would have to become a Buddhist. The monks examined who could defeat him and found that only Aryadeva who was living near Amaravati in south India could do so. Thinking how to send him a message, they wrote a note and put it in a torma and put it on the roof. Mahakala manifested as a crow, ate the torma, and brought the message to Aryadeva in south India. Aryadeva read the note and went to ask his teacher Nagarjuna for permission to go. Nagarjuna said that he would take the position of the Samkyas and that Aryadeva should practice debating with him. When Ashvagosha was winning, he took his shoes and circled them three times around Nagarjuna's head. Nagarjuna said that as a result he would win the debate but would encounter an obstacle on his way to Nalanda. In fact, along the road Aryadeva met a blind man who asked him for an eye and out of compassion Aryadeva gave him one. When Aryadeva arrived at Nalanda, Ashvagosha was standing in the doorway of the temple examining the monks as they entered. When Aryadeva came to the doorstep Ashvagosha said to him "This previously non-existent bald head, from where does it come?" Aryadeva said that it came from the neck, to which Ashvagosha had no reply. Ashvagosha then asked him "Am I coming or going?" to which Aryadeva said "That depends on your motivation." Again Ashvagosha had no reply. They then engaged in the debate for an entire day. Ashvagosha had someone who would write the questions to ask Aryadeva on a slate. Aryadeva manifested someone who spilled oil on the slate due to which Ashvagosha could not see the answers. Then Ashvagosha manifested a beautiful woman to distract Aryadeva, whereupon Aryadeva manifested a man with an erection due to which the beautiful woman was embarrassed and left. Then Ashvagosha created a manifestation of a bird who would talk to him, so Aryadeva manifested a cat who chases the bird away. In this way Ashvagosha lost the debate. Previously he had agreed to follow the Buddhists if he lost but not wanting to do this, he flew off into the sky. Aryadeva followed him and flew together with him but at a certain point he told Ashvagosha that if he went any higher he would die. Ashvagosha had very long hair and Aryadeva told him to throw his hair into the wind to verify this, whereupon Ashvagosha's hair was cut off by the wind. Filled with fear he returned with Aryadeva to Nalanda where the monks looked him in the library. He began to read the scriptures and in one found a passage in which the Buddha predicted that in the future he would debate with Aryadeva and lose. He generated faith in Buddhism and later on wrote the *Life Stories* of the Buddha and other texts, including poetry, to purify his previous mistaken attitude. He became a Prasangika Madhyamaka among the four Buddhist tenets.

Saturday afternoon, 9 September 2006

Why do those knowing reality,  
 Who exist among the worldly, also not see it?  
 If you say "The world's are not valid cognizers,"  
 Also that which is clearly seen would not be true. (137)

The Samkyas assert that at the time of the cause, the result also exists. Since your Teacher knows this why does he not wear cotton seeds but wears cotton cloth? He can see the cotton cloth in the cotton seeds, whereas others cannot. For this reason at the time of the cause, the result does not exist. The Samkyas say that the seeing of ordinary worldly beings is not a valid cognizer, and therefore they do not realize that the result exists at the time of the cause. Since worldly people see manifest things, then these too would not be true because it would follow that the valid cognizers of worldly people are not valid.

“If valid cognizers are not valid,  
Is that understood by them not false?  
Meditation on emptiness with respect to reality  
Would, because of that, be incorrect.” (138)

The Samkyas respond that the fault is similar for the Prasangika. All valid cognizers do not exist truly, because valid cognizers are not truly existent they are not valid. If valid cognizers do not exist truly or inherently then they are falsities, that is, conventionally existent. Since they are conventionally existent, they know conventionally existent objects. The Samkyas say that this is not right, the all-obscuring is not valid knowing because it is mistaken. Because of this, meditation on emptiness also becomes incorrect. This is because a valid cognizer is not truly existent but is deceptive. Since valid cognizers are valid, a conventionally-existent valid cognizer can realize emptiness. Although a valid cognizer is a conventional truth, its object is an ultimate truth yet there is no contradiction.

Without contacting the thing that is investigated  
The non-thingness of that will not be apprehended.  
Therefore, it is any thing that is false.  
The non-thingness of that is clearly false. (139)

Without recognizing the object of negation, it cannot be negated, that is, its emptiness cannot be apprehended. Therefore, by recognizing the object of negation clearly, it is possible to eliminate it and realize the phenomena that its base is empty. The object of negation is true existence, which, if it existed, should be findable by analytical meditation. First we need to recognize true existence clearly. For example, we see that there are no horns on the head of human beings. However, in order to recognize this absence of horns, we first need to understand what horns are and how they would be if they did exist. Without doing this, one cannot talk about an absence of horns. If the object of negation, true existence, does not arise clearly to us as a mental image, we will not be able to understand the emptiness of this true existence. Therefore, in order for the wise to understand and realize emptiness, they first need to have the object of negation arise clearly to their mind.

Therefore, regarding a son who dies in a dream,  
The projection thinking “He is no more,”  
Blocks the projection that he exists;  
But that too is false. (140)

The example given here is that of someone who dreams of his son or daughter’s death, due to which this person comes to think that he or she no longer exists. From the Prasangika Madhyamaka point of view in a dream to think “My son has died,” and “He is no more” blocks the thought of an existent son. In this case, the antidote is false and so too is the object it abandons. Therefore, that the valid cognizer is false and its object is false is not contradictory. On the other hand, you Samkyas accept that all phenomena are truly existent, therefore you cannot accept a faulty valid cognizer or a conventionally-existent valid cognizer.

Therefore, by thorough analysis in this way,  
Nothing exists without a cause. (141ab)

This reasoning also refutes that without a cause, a result does not arise. The Charvakas assert that phenomena arise without causes.

Conditions also do not abide,

Whether individual or gathered together. (141cd)

Some people assert that results are produced from both self and other. This is the assertion that is refuted here. For example, a sprout is the result of causes and conditions such as water, fertilizer, and so forth that abide individually and are also gathered together. For example, in this cup there abides or exists tea, in which case the support is the cup and the supported is the tea. However, causes and conditions do not abide in the manner of support and supported. There are three or four types of conditions which, by means of their gradual change, bring a result. For example, if we sow a rice seed in a field and water it, give it fertilizer, and so forth, the seed will gradually transform and give rise to a green sprout. An unchanging cause cannot give rise to a result.

Also, not coming from something else,  
They do not abide, they do not go. (142ab)

Phenomena do not come in the mode of being truly existent or inherently existent, and do not go in the mode of being truly existent or inherently existent. All phenomena, for example, our body aggregate or the person, as the subject, is not produced inherently or truly because it is not produced from self, not produced from other, not produced from both, and not produced without a cause.

How does that which is considered to be true  
By ignorance differ from an illusion? (142cd)

This sets out the reasoning of dependent-arising. All beings due to ignorance perceive true existence. However, when analyzed, things are found to not exist truly but to be similar to illusions. Illusions do not actually exist but still they appear due to the coming together of conditions. For example, due to mantra and substance and the pollution of the eye, a stick appears as a handsome man or beautiful woman although they do not actually exist. Also in a good dream we might fly in the sky, but when we wake this does not exist. Similarly although the reflection of our face in a mirror appears to be our actual face, it is not an actual face. Likewise, while phenomena are empty of inherent existence, they appear to us as though truly existent.

Whatever is emanated by an illusionist and  
Whatever is emanated by causes  
Should be investigated as to  
Where they come from and also to where they go. (143)

Like a horse, bull, and so forth created by an illusionist, whatever is produced by causes is not inherently established because it is produced from somewhere and goes somewhere or finishes. Therefore, the aggregates do not exist inherently because they exist as dependent-relations, like, for example, a reflection. If we analyze, we will see that things come from causes and cease, therefore they are not inherently existent.

Whatever is seen due to being close,  
But is not if that does not exist,  
Is similar to a reflection in a mirror in being fabricated.  
How can it be truly existent? (144)

For example, karmic formations arise from the first link of ignorance, and a sprout arises from a seed. These kind of causes which are close can be seen, whereas if the causes are not existent they cannot produce these results, but are similar to a reflection. Without a seed, the result, a sprout, cannot arise. Likewise, if our face does not exist in front of a mirror, it cannot give rise to the

reflection of face. If our face exists in front of the mirror, its reflection appears. This shows dependent-arising, that is, phenomena do not arise without causes and conditions. If phenomena were truly existent it would not be necessary for our face to be in front of a mirror for the reflection of our face to exist in a mirror. That which exists truly never changes.

Inherently existent production is the next object of negation.

For things that exist,  
What need is there for a cause?  
Also for those that do not exist,  
What need is there for a cause? (145)

If things already existed they would not need a cause because they would be produced by nature. If phenomena were inherently produced it would be useless for them to have causes because they would be produced by nature. If the result does not exist, there is no need to produce it, therefore there is no need for a cause. All things or all results do not exist at the time of the cause but will be produced in the future.

The Prasangika Madhyamaka accept that all phenomena, causes and results, are empty of inherent existence and like illusions and reflections. Next there is a discussion of non-things which cannot be changed by any causes.

Even by a hundred million causes,  
A non-thing is not transformed.  
How could that state become a thing?  
Also what else would be transformed into a thing? (146)

Even a hundred million causes cannot change a non-thing into a thing. There is no one who can change a non-thing into a thing. If you say that they can be changed, which would mean that non-things either give up being a non-thing or do not give up being a non-thing and then transform into things. However, a non-thing cannot become a thing.

(Note: There were no teachings Sunday, 10 September due to the subsequent permission of Vaishravana.)