Try to develop a good motivation wishing to attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings and for this purpose listen to the teachings. We need to strive to develop a mind of a love for all sentient beings who are tormented by different types of sufferings. Therefore, we need to develop the good motivation that wishes sentient beings to be free from sufferings and problems and their causes and conditions and that they achieve happiness and the causes of happiness.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

Also that without mind is not the self
Because it is not mind, like a vase and so forth.
Nonetheless, if because it is endowed with mind
It is conscious, it follows that the non-conscious disintegrates. (68)

The Vaisheshikas (?) and Naiyayikas (?) (rig pa chen) assert that without mind is not the self because that without mind is matter. That is not self because that does not have mind, for example, like a vase. They say that the self is not matter but it is related to a collection, therefore it possesses mind and is therefore conscious, that is, it knows objects. It follows that which previously did not know an object does not exist by nature or ultimately, therefore it disintegrates. It does not exist truly because it understands objects by means of other, that is, by the power of later conditions. It is not truly existent because it depends on other conditions, that is, this is how it understands objects.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

If the self does not change,
How can it act due to mind?
Thus, that which is not conscious and free from activity –
Space – would also act as a self. (69)

If the self does not change but is permanent how can the mind perform actions? It would not be able to act, that is, to understand, because it is not conscious. You said that it was separate from activity, like space, therefore space would also act as a self. However, space is no self.

Some non-Buddhist schools say the self, consciousness, knower, and being are synonyms. They are permanent. These schools assert that causes and results are created by a primordial principal of general principal. When the being sees this, the primordial principal becomes as though ashamed and withdraws all its creations, leaving only the self, consciousness, knower, or being and liberation is achieved. These assertions are refuted by Buddhist schools such as the Prasangika Madhyamaka.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

“If a self does not exist,
A relationship between action and result would not be suitable.
Having done an action, one would disintegrate,
Whereby whose action would it be?” (70)
The Prasangika say that if a self does not exist a relationship between action and result would not be suitable, and it would not be suitable to meditate on compassion because a self does not exist. Then the non-Buddhist schools in turn rely.

According to the Prasangika Madhyamaka the self does not exist inherently, although the self does exist conventionally. They make this differentiation, whereas the other tenets do not. The Prasangika Madhyamaka says that if the basis of being bound by afflictions or being liberated from afflictions does not exist since all phenomena disintegrate momentarily, the relationship between a virtuous or non-virtuous action and its result would not exist because they also disintegrate momentarily, then who would experience the result? And who created the action? If in the first moment the self creates an action and in the second moment it disintegrates then who would experience the result? No one would experience the result.

These schools assert that because the self is permanent it does not disintegrate and therefore it is what experiences the result in the future. Because the self creates the action and continues to abide, it experiences the result in the future. If, on the other hand, the self creates an action and in the second instant disintegrates, then who experiences the result? Then the Prasangika Madhyamikas reply to this.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

> Since it is established for both of us
> That the basis of the action and of the result are different
> And that there is no self that does it,
> Is it not meaningless to argue about this? (71)

The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that the basis of the action that is the cause, the self that creates the action, and the basis of the result to be utilized, the self that experiences the result, are different. These two are different substances. Hence, the being who experiences the result is not the being who created the action. This is accepted by both of us. Therefore, is it not meaningless to argue or debate about this? At the time the action is created, the result is not experienced. You too accept this. When a seed is sown in a field, at that time the result, the plant, does not yet exist and cannot be utilized. It can only be utilized later on. For example, a father sows seeds in the ground such that later on his entire family can later on eat the resulting crops. Therefore, the being who created the cause, and the being who experiences the result are different.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

> It is impossible to see
> That possessing the cause as well as the result.

At the very time of the cause, the result is not utilized or experienced. This is not seen by anyone.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

> In dependence on being one continuum,
> He taught “The doer is the experiencer.” (72)

The aggregates are one continuum. Thus, the aggregates that planted the seed later on become the utilizer of the result. In other words, the continuity of the one who created the cause becomes the one who experiences the result. Therefore, the doer or the creator of the cause later on becomes the experiencer because the aggregates are a continuum.
Try to meditate a little bit, checking the fact that the self does not exist inherently because it is a dependent-relation. Because the self creates or collects causes, for example, non-virtues, in the future the self experiences the result, suffering. Likewise, it creates virtue due to which later on it experiences the result of happiness. However, most beings mainly create non-virtues motivated by the three mental poisons – attachment, hatred, and ignorance – as a cause. These non-virtues include killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, divisive speech, harsh words, idle talk, and covetousness, malice, and wrong view. Due to the afflictions in the mind, we mostly create non-virtue as a result of which we will experience suffering. Because of this, we need to try to develop a loving-kind mind toward all sentient beings thinking: “How wonderful it would be if all sentient beings were free from suffering and the causes of suffering. May they be free from suffering and the causes of suffering. I myself will take upon the responsibility to free them from suffering and the causes of suffering.” In cyclic existence we experience suffering and happiness, the root of all this is ignorance, that is, the conception of a self of phenomena, the apprehending of true or inherent existence. This ignorance is the root of cyclic existence; it gives rise to attachment, hatred, and so forth. Therefore, we need to meditate on the fact that phenomena do not exist inherently because they are dependent-relations. In this way we should meditate on emptiness or dependent-relation.

Saturday morning, 11 February 2006

Try to develop a good motivation wishing to attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings and for this purpose to listen to the teachings. We need to strive to understand emptiness or shunyata by way of wisdom. To do this we need to understand the object of negation, the conception that all phenomena exist inherently or truly or independently, but exist very solidly.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

The mind of the past and of the future
Are not the self because they do not exist.
“The mind that has been produced is the self.”
When that disintegrates, there would no longer be a self. (73)

The past and future mind are not the self. Why? Because the past has already disintegrated or ceased, and the future has not yet been produced, they are not the self. Then they say that the present mind is the self, but because in the second instant it disintegrates the self would no longer exist. If our present mind, which has been produced and has not yet disintegrated, were the self there is the consequence that in the second moment when it disintegrates also the self would no longer exist.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

For example, when the trunk of a banana tree
Is split into parts, there is nothing at all.
Likewise, when sought with thorough analysis,
The self is also not real. (74)

We need to do analytical meditation. For example, when a banana tree is separated into parts, nothing real is found. Likewise, the self does not exist inherently or truly because when subjected to thorough analysis an inherently existent or truly existent self cannot be found. The reasoning that proves this by way of analysis will be explained below when we examine each part of the body, the head, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and so forth, checking whether it is the self. Likewise, we examine each of the individual organs inside our body, but still a self cannot be found. For example, we
should check whether our happiness feeling is the self, whether unhappiness feeling is the self, an whether neutral feeling is the self, whereby none of these feelings will be found to be the self. Then we examine the discrimination aggregate asking whether correct discrimination or incorrect discrimination is the self or not. Then we examine the compositional factors aggregate, which includes the non-associated compositional factors and the forty-nine mental factors, examining each one as to whether it is or not the self. If we check in this way, we will find that none of the mental factors are the self. Then we examine the consciousness aggregate, asking ourselves whether or not the eye consequence, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, or mental consciousness is the self. Then we examine whether the virtuous mind, non-virtuous mind, or neutral mind is the self. By examining in this way we will not find the self.

A self that is separate from the five aggregates does not exist. It is not like a man separate from his wife which can be found. Because when by means of this analysis we cannot find a self, the conclusion is that an inherently existent self does not exist.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

“Well then, if sentient beings do not exist, For whom is compassion developed?”
For those who are imputed by ignorance
For whom a promise has been made for the sake of the result. (75)

Someone argues saying that if there is no inherently existent self or being, then it would not be correct to meditate on compassion and love because sentient beings do not exist. He says that if sentient beings do not exist inherently or are not inherently established, then for whom does one develop compassion given that the object of compassion does not exist. The Prasangika Madhyamikas say that there is no fault because the sentient beings who are imputed by ignorance for whom a promise has been made for the sake of the result, liberation, do exist. In other words, the sentient beings who are imputed by ignorance yet exist conventionally are the object of compassion. The sentient beings imputed by ignorance to exist inherently are objects to be negated, but the basis of the imputation, the sentient beings themselves, are not to be negated because they exist conventionally. Those who are imputed saying “Poor sentient beings” are objects of compassion.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

“If sentient beings do not exist, who [obtains] the results?”
That they are true, nonetheless, is asserted from ignorance.
In order to totally pacify suffering,
One should not reject the ignorance of results. (76)

Someone says that if sentient beings do not exist, then even if we familiarize with compassion toward them, who will obtain the result of buddhahood? In other words, since there is no one who experiences the result of meditating on compassion, why do so? The answer is that although causes and results do not exist inherently, conventionally sentient beings are imputed by ignorance, they are the objects of compassion and therefore there is no contradiction. In order to pacify the suffering of sentient beings we must strive to obtain the result, buddhahood.

Since we cannot abandon non-afflictive ignorance presently, in order to achieve omniscience we must meditate on thusness or suchness. On the other hand, in order to develop compassion, for example, it is not necessary to differentiate sentient beings as inherently existent or non-inherently existent. In other words, we do not need to think about whether they are inherently or non-inherently existent, since it is enough to understand that they suffering and that there are causes of
their sufferings and generate the wish to free them from sufferings and their causes and in this way meditate on compassion. Chandrakirti’s *Supplement to the Middle Way* sets out three types of compassion: the compassion observing mere sentient beings, the compassion observing phenomena, and non-observing compassion. Therefore, there is no need to examine whether sentient beings exist truly or not, it is enough to take mere sentient beings as the observed object of our compassion, trying to understand their suffering and wishing to liberate them from suffering and its causes. In this way we can develop compassion. In addition, the compassion observing phenomena observes all sentient beings in terms of the attribute of impermanence of true sufferings, that is, in terms of their changing momentarily. Thus, in this case we meditate on compassion through observing momentarily-changing sentient beings. Because sentient beings are afflicted by the suffering of suffering, suffering of change, and all pervasive suffering, sometimes they experience the suffering of heat, sometimes cold, sometimes hunger, sometimes thirst, sometimes pain, and so forth. Because all sentient beings are tormented by suffering we should meditate on the compassion that wishes them to be free from all these sufferings.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

> The pride that is the cause of suffering  
> Increases due to ignorance regarding the self.  
> If it is said “But there is no turning away from that,”  
> Meditation on selflessness is the best.

“Previously you said that all objects imputed by ignorance to be inherently existent are to be refuted, but now you say that there exists a cause of suffering, why is this?” Pride is the cause of suffering, this pride is not the usual pride but in this case is the ignorance that apprehends a truly existent self, that apprehends I. This ignorance is a cause that produces suffering. It is the root of cyclic existence, it acts to increase suffering. Therefore, we need to eliminate such ignorance. In addition, this can be done. Due to ignorance we cling to things, this happens because we have not eliminated ignorance from our mind. We have not put an end to ignorance, to the apprehending of a self – I and mine. Therefore, we need to eliminate this ignorance. It leads to other afflictions which cannot be eliminated unless ignorance is eliminated. The other schools think that this ignorance apprehending a self cannot be eliminated because the self exists. From the point of view of the Prasangika Madhyamaka the apprehending of a self CAN be eliminated because the self is mistakenly held to exist inherently or truly whereas in nature the self and all phenomena do not exist inherently. Therefore, this apprehension is mistaken. This ignorance, which is a mistaken consciousness, is actually very weak and inferior, therefore it can be eliminated. By meditating on the supreme consciousness, which is the wisdom realizing emptiness, we can realize unmistakenly the nature of all phenomena. This completely eradicates the ignorance that is a mistaken consciousness. Therefore, its possible to meditate on selflessness and to generate compassion and so forth.

Up to now the text has set out the selflessness of beings, but now it sets out the selflessness of phenomena. The extensive explanation of the selflessness of phenomena has three divisions. The first sets out the meditation on the selflessness of phenomena by way of the four close placements of mindfulness: close placement of mindfulness on the body, on feeling, on mind, and on phenomena. In other words, these are the four objects of the four close placements of mindfulness. Then the second division dispels the argument that the division into two truths is not right. Then the third division proves selflessness by way of reasonings. The first division is further divided into the meditation on the close placement of mindfulness on the body, then the meditation on the close placement of mindfulness on feelings, then the meditation on the close placement of mindfulness on the mind, and then the meditation on the close placement of mindfulness on phenomena. The meditation on the close placement of mindfulness on the body is also further divided into four:
1. establishing the parts of the body to not exist inherently
2. establishing the limbs of the body to not exist inherently
3. we should not be attached to the body since it does not exist inherently, like a dream
4. an inherently existent self with respect to the body that is the form aggregate also does not exist

If our body, which is not established inherently or truly, were inherently existent also all its parts and limbs would have to exist inherently, but they do not. The body is merely imputed upon the collection of its parts.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

The body is not the feet or calves,
The thighs and loins are also not the body.
Neither are the abdomen and back the body.
The chest and shoulders are not the body either.
The ribs and hands are also not the body.

The armpits and upper arms are also not the body.
Even the inner organs are not it.
The head and neck are also not the body.
With regard to them, what is the body? (78)

We know very well that the individual parts of the body are not the body, that is, they are not the form aggregate but are part of the form aggregate. We should examine the body in order to eliminate the idea that the body is the self. None of the parts are the body since each one is given a particular name, we do not call the parts “my body.” Instead we say “my head,” “my nose,” “my tongue,” “my arm,” “my leg,” and so forth, we do not talk about them saying “my body.” This is a conventional understanding, therefore all these parts are not the body. Hence, if we examine each part separately we will not find a truly existent body. For this reason also the self does not exist inherently. The person is imputed on the aggregates, the body and so forth, that is, on phenomena. Instead the I is the self. Phenomena in this context is related to our body and not to external phenomena such as tables, houses, and so forth.

Between the two conceptions of a self, first there arises the conception of a self of phenomena, that is, of the body, and then the conception of a self of persons. On the other hand, with respect to realizing the two selflessnesses, first we must realize the selflessness of the person or being and then the selflessness of phenomena. For example, when a stranger enters the room, we first see his aggregates whereupon the conception of a self of phenomena arises. Then, after he introduces himself as Corrado, we think “Oh, he is Corrado,” and apprehend the person to be Corrado. The self or being relies on or is imputed on the aggregates, that is, the person is imputed as Corrado, Daniele, Raffaello, and so forth on the basis of his aggregates.

Saturday afternoon, 11 February 2006

Develop the motivation wishing to attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings and for this purpose to listen to the teachings.

None of the parts or limbs of the body are the body. There is also not a body that exists separate from the parts of the body.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:
If the body were to abide
By each area in all of them,
Although indeed its parts abide in its parts,
In what does it itself abide?  

If the body in its entirety
Were to abide in the hands and so forth,
However many hands there are and so forth,
That many bodies would there be.

Does the body abide in all its parts or not? If the entire body abides in each area or side of the body, does it abide in the hand? If it abides in the hands and so forth there would be as many bodies as there are hands and so forth. There would also be that many minds. There would also be that many heads because in each part of the body there is the body and therefore also a head. But if in all parts of the body there does not exist the body, then where is the body? Then does it not exist? If like this, where do we abide in this body? The consequence would be that if we abide in all parts of the body there would be many selves. For example, it would mean that in each of the five fingers of a hand, there would be a self, whereby there would be ten selves. We should analyze in this way.

If in each body part there abides a self, then also in the stomach there would be ten fingers, two arms, two legs, two shoulders, and so forth. The debate goes like this. Thus, the entire body does not abide in each part. There are not many heads, arms, and so forth. In other words, the body is not truly existent. If it were truly existent, it would follow that the person abides in all parts of the body. However, there does exist a conventionally existent or deceptively existent being.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

If the body does not exist outside and inside them,
How could the hands and so forth have a body?
If it is not other than the hands and so forth,
How could it exist?

By analysis we should check in this way. This commentary says that outside and inside refer to the Buddhist schools who accept a being that exists outside the body, the Tirthikas accept a being that is inside who is a knower or utilizer. For Buddhists, because the being can be seen, it exists externally, whereas the Tirthikas accept a being that exists inside that is not the external body. If the body exists inherently, then also the hands and so forth exist inherently. In each part of the body there would be a being. The Tirthikas accept an inherently existent school as do the lower Buddhist schools.

A body that is a different entity from the limbs, the hands and so forth, does not exist, therefore the body does not exist inherently or truly. This is according to the Prasangika Madhyamaka.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

Thus, due to ignorance regarding the arms and so forth
Of a non-existent body, a body comes to mind;
Like, due to the feature of it being arranged in that shape,
The mind [apprehends] a cairn to be a human being.

The body does not exist inherently but due to ignorance the body appears to exist inherently. Ignorance apprehends an inherently existent body. With ignorance as a mistaken cause, even though the body does not exist inherently, the arms and so forth are apprehended to exist inherently.
Thinking in this way, the mind apprehends an inherently existent body. It is like a cairn, a pile of stones, in a garden that is apprehended to be a man. It seems that a man exists there, were no man exists. For example, it like a mannequin dressed in clothing and jewelry that from a distance appears to be an actual well-dressed woman. The cause of these appearances is ignorance. We need to try to understand this. does this appearance always arise? For example, if a human being is seen at a far distance high up on a mountain side, it appears to be a black shape without being able to distinguish whether he or she is tall or short, fat or thin, and so forth. Perhaps it cannot even be distinguished to be a human. Another example is that when we watch a boat go out to sea, at a certain point it seems to sink into the water. It appears like this.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

As long as the conditions are collected together,  
For that long the body will appear as though it were a being.  
Likewise, as long as the hands and so forth exist,  
For that long will a body appear there.  

As long as the condition of a lack of clarity exists a cairn will appear to be the body of a human being. For that period of time we will also think that the cairn that appears to be a human being has hands and so forth. This mistaken appearance remains as long as the causes and conditions of a lack of clarity remain.

As long as we think that the body is inherently existent for that long will an inherently existent body appear to the mind. For as long as the conditions, the parts, are collected together, for that long will there be the mistaken appearance. But the parts or limbs of the body do not exist inherently.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

Similarly, because they are a collection of fingers,  
The hands are also that.  
Because they too are a collection of segments,  
Since the segments are also divided into their parts,  

Since the parts are also divided into particles,  
Since those particles are also divided into directional parts,  
Because the directions too, divided, are free from parts,  
Like space, therefore, particles also do not exist.

The body is composed of a collection of limbs on which is imputed the body. It does not exist inherently or truly. These limbs in turn are further divided into parts, that is, into segments. These joints are also further divided into segments, for example, a finger is composed of three segments, which can also be further divided. Therefore, a finger is also imputed on its parts. Because of this the hand is not established inherently. Also because the fingers are imputed on a collection of segments, they too do not exist inherently. These segments are also divided into parts, whereby they too do not exist inherently. Since the parts are also further divided into particles, they too do not exist inherently. The particles are also divided into directional parts, that is, an eastern part, western part, northern part, and southern part. These are also imputed in dependence on the direction, therefore they too do not exist inherently. Since the directional particles can be further divided, they are free from inherent existence. They are like space which is empty because it does not depend on particles, which are form. Space is not form.

If particles were inherently established, then partless particles would need to be accepted, but they do not exist. If partless particle were represented by a rice grain, if we were to place the rice
grain on our hand and surround it by other particles in the four directions, above, and below, then if there were no parts then the eastern side would have to touch the western side and so forth but it does not, therefore it too has parts. If the eastern particle were to touch the western particle, they would become one. This is not right. The rice grain has six parts, the four in the four cardinal directions, above, and below. We need to understand this. There are schools who accept the existence of partless particles who can be refuted by debating in this way.

Hence, who, having analyzed,
Would be attached to such dream-like form?
When, like that, the body does not exist,
What are men? What are women? (87)

Since the body is like a dream, why be attached to it? In a dream a very attractive body can appear, which, when not analyzed, seems to exist from its own side. However, if we examine it, we will find that it does not exist. Those who are intelligent and can analyze upon examining this will find that this body is not an object to be attached to. Why be attached to an object that appears but does not exist? It is a similar case for men and women who are also not established inherently. Since the body is not inherently existent, also men and women are not inherently existent. We should analyze in this way, whereby we will come to realize the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, that is, the lack of inherent existence of the being and of the body. Although some people think that realizing the lack of a self-sufficient substantially existent being is the realization of the selflessness of persons but it is not, it is a coarse realization. Also thinking that that there is no object of utilization of such a self-sufficient substantially existent being is the selflessness of phenomena is not right, this is a coarse realization.

The discussion of the close placement of mindfulness on the body is concluded and next there is a discussion of the close placement of mindfulness on feelings. This section is also further divided:
1. refuting that feelings are inherently existent
2. refuting that the cause of feeling is inherently existent
3. refuting that the observed object of feelings is inherently existent

Feeling is a subject, an object-possessor. It is not inherently existent. Likewise, suffering or unpleasant feeling does not exist inherently, nor does happy feeling. Therefore, the yogi abides meditating on the lack of inherently existent feeling. Just as the body does not exist inherently, also feelings do not exist inherently.

If suffering exists in reality,
Why does it not harm intense joy?
If there is happiness, why do those tormented by sorrow and so on
Not find joy in the delicious and so forth? (88)

Suffering is that which is experienced. The experience of suffering is a feeling. Does suffering exist like that in the mental consciousness, that is, inherently? If it exists like this, it would never change. As a result one would never experience pleasant feeling because the pleasant feeling would harm the suffering feeling. If suffering were inherently existent and therefore always existent, there would never be an occasion for happy feeling to arise. However, we see that sometimes happy feeling arises. Therefore, suffering feeling does not exist inherently because it is occasional in that sometimes there is suffering feeling and sometimes there is happy feeling. We can see this for ourselves. Therefore, we should try to do analytical meditation on this whereby we can come to understand the selflessness of the being and the selflessness of phenomena.

In this way we should meditate on the four close placements of mindfulness on the body, feelings, mind, and phenomena. We should try to develop this mindfulness.
Sunday morning, 12 February 2006

Try to develop a good motivation wishing to attain enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings and for this purpose to listen to the teachings.

The object is suffering, the subject that experiences it is feeling. If suffering feeling exists from its own side, then the suffering feeling in a mental consciousness would be inherently existent and therefore could not change, whereby we would never experience happy feeling or the feeling of joy. However, suffering feeling is harmed by happy feeling, and happy feeling is harmed by suffering feeling. At times suffering feeling arises, at other times happy feeling, therefore feelings do not exist inherently. In short, suffering feeling does not exist inherently. In our daily sometimes we experience suffering and sometimes we experience happiness.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

Because it is overwhelmed by the strong,  
It is not experienced.  
How can that which is not  
The nature of experience be feeling?

Feeling is not inherently existent, otherwise it could not be experienced. However, we experience happy feelings and so forth. When one feeling is strong, for example, happy feeling, it overwhelms suffering feeling. However, if suffering feeling existed inherently it could not be overcome by a strong happy feeling. Subtle suffering feeling cannot overcome or harm strong happy feeling. Likewise, subtle happiness cannot overcome or harm great suffering. Subtle happiness feeling is happiness feeling and subtle suffering feeling is the suffering feeling, but they are not strong. Thus, they cannot exist inherently.

You say “The suffering that exists is subtle.  
Is not the coarse [aspect] of it dispelled?  
There is mere joy distinct from it.”

The subtle is also that.

The opponent says that when we experience strong happiness, at that time there is also subtle suffering present in our continuum. The coarse suffering is not dispelled or eliminated. Strong joy can eliminate unhappiness but still subtle suffering remains in the mind but are not experienced. When there is strong unhappiness or lack of enjoyment, at that time mere joy, subtle happiness, still remains. Subtle happiness is still the nature of happiness. Likewise, subtle suffering is suffering.

*Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva* says:

If the conditions adverse to it are produced,  
Suffering is not produced.  
Conceiving it to be feeling,  
Is it not established as “strongly adhered to”?

When there are conditions adverse to it, suffering is not produced. For example, when eating delicious food or drinking delicious drinks there are conditions adverse to suffering whereby happiness is produced. At that time is suffering feeling produced in the mind or not? Happy feeling or suffering feeling is adhered to by conception, they are merely imputed by thought. It is
established by imputation. Eating, drinking, and so forth are imputed by conception to be the cause of happiness or cause of suffering. This is imputed by thought. For example, if we eat bad tasting food or drink bad tasting drinks we experience mental suffering, but all this is imputed by conception. Therefore, they do not exist from their own side or inherently. The advice given here is to meditate on the lack of inherent existence of feelings, that is, feelings are taken as the object of meditation.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva

Because of that, its antidote
Thorough analysis, is to be meditated.
The meditative stabilization that arises from the field
Of thorough investigation is the food of a yogi. (92)

Yogis with meditative stabilization do not need to rely on coarse food, as they are nourished y their meditative stabilization nourishes. The antidote to adhering to inherently existent feelings is meditation on emptiness. By thorough analysis we develop the special insight that observes only emptiness. In addition, calm abiding is achieved. Through familiarizing with the meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight, the body of the meditator develops, whereby it is said to be the food of a yogi. Just as we eat ordinary food and drink ordinary drinks in order to keep our body healthy, so too does the food of meditative stabilization keep the body of a yogi healthy. Therefore, we need to try to realize emptiness by meditating single pointedly on it.

Feeling arises from a cause. But that an inherently existent feeling arises from an inherently existent cause is to be refuted. One cause is the object, for example, a form; another is the sense power or faculty. The meeting of the object condition, the sense power, and the consciousness is also lacking in inherent existence.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

If there were a gap between the sense power and object,
How would they meet? (93ab)

The sense power and the object meet, but do not inherently meet. How do the particles of the sense powers and the particles of the object meet? Does something exist between them or not? If there is something between them, they could not meet. What is it that exists between them? The opponents say that that there exist particles of darkness and particles of light between them.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva

Also if there were no gap, being a unit
What would meet with what? (93cd)

If there was nothing between them, they would be a single unit. If they are one, what would meet with what? How could it be said that two things meet? This could not be said. If there is nothing between the two particles, they would be a single entity. In order for meeting to occur, two things are not necessary. A single thing cannot be said to meet. If there is nothing between the subtle particles, they cannot be said either to meet or not meet.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:
A subtle particle does not enter a subtle particle.
They are without an interval and equal.
Without entering, they do not mix, and
Without mixing, they do not meet.  \[94\]

A subtle particle does not enter into another subtle particle, this does not exist. These particles are the same or equal in size, it is not that one is bigger and the other is smaller. If, on the other hand, they were not equal in size, one would be bigger and the other smaller. If one particle does not enter another, they do not mix. If they do not mix, they cannot be said to meet.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva

How could it be right to say
“Even though they are partless, they meet”?
If you have seen that which meets
But yet is partless, show it to me! \[95\]

Partless particles are not accepted by the Prasangika Madhyamikas. That which does not have parts cannot meet. In short, the partless cannot meet. Therefore, they do not exist. How can partless particles be said to meet? This is not right. If particles are partless they cannot meet and so forth. Hence the Prasangika Madhyamikas say that if you say that the particles can meet but are partless, then please show it to us! Hence, partless particles do not exist. Particles have parts, the part in the eastern direction, the part in the southern direction, the part in the western direction, the part in the northern direction, the part above, and the part below.

Engaging in the Deeds of a Bodhisattva says:

It is not correct for there to be a meeting
With consciousness, which is without form.
Because even a collection is not a thing,
It is as was thoroughly analyzed before. \[96\]

The meeting with an inherently existent consciousness also is to be refuted. The consciousness is not like our body, the form aggregate, therefore there cannot be any meeting with it. There is also not a meeting with the coarse. The coarse are an agglomeration or collection of many particles. Therefore, the coarse also does not exist inherently and therefore there cannot be a meeting. A collection is not an inherently existent thing. This was thorough analyzed before in the case of examining the hand, which is composed of five fingers, each finger composed of segments, and so forth, checking whether the body exists in all five fingers (which would arrive at the consequence that there are five bodies) and so forth. By analyzing in this way, we come to understand that coarse form is a collection of many particles.

Try to develop the understanding that all phenomena do not exist inherently or truly, but exist in dependence on causes and conditions, in dependence on their parts, and in dependence on the name imputed by thought.

END